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TORTS-MOTOR VEHICLES-LIABILITY FOR
KILLING LIVESTOCK*

Practically every discussion of the liability of motorists or of the
owners of livestock begins with a reference to common law principles.
This Comment is no exception. Briefly, at common law the owner of
animals had no duty to restrain them from running at large on the
roads unless he was aware of their dangerous propensities; he was
not liable for injuries resulting from his livestock running at large
unless such injuries could have been anticipated.' In most states having open range lands, this rule was applied to charge motorists with
liability for striking domestic animals on open range roads.2 This
was commonly understood to be the law in New Mexico, though there
had never been a New Mexico Supreme Court case deciding the issue.8
In December, 1965, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Grubb
v. Wolfe 4 held that the owner of livestock could not recover for the
death or injury of his livestock on an open range road without proof
that he had exercised due care in the protection of the animals. Thus
the supreme court proclaimed the death of the frontier in New Mexico. This Comment will examine the background and reasoning for
the decision in Grubb v. Wolfe, consider the subsequent legislative
enactments designed to overcome the requirements of Grubb, and
propose solutions concerning what is basically an economic, not a
legal, problem.
The defendant, Donald Wolfe, was driving at a speed of 60 to 65
miles per hour in a 70-mile speed zone along a paved state highway
that ran through unfenced national forest lands. He had just passed
a sign warning him of livestock on the highway. Also, since Wolfe
had traveled the road daily for several weeks, he knew cattle were
in the area.5 A 500-pound calf ran in front of Wolfe's car, and the
calf was killed in the collision. Grubb, the holder of a forest grazing
permit and owner of the calf, sued Wolfe for the calf's value.
The trial court permitted the defendant's attorney to ask the plain-

* Grubb v. Wolfe,

408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965) ; N.M. Laws 1966, ch. 44.
1. See Annot., 140 A.L.R. 742 (1942), and cases cited therein.
2. Carvel v. Kusel, 205 S.W. 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). Contra, Galeppi Bros. v.
Bartlett, 120 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1941).
3. Interview With Robert W. Talbott, Executive Secretary, New Mexico Cattle
Growers' Association, March 21,1966.
4. 408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965).
5. Brief for Appellant, pp 19-20, Grubb v. Wolfe, 408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965).
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tiff if he had made any attempts to keep his cattle off the highway.
The plaintiff testified that his cattle had a "preferential right" to the
highway; he had made no effort to prevent their wandering on the
road.' In its instruction to the jury, the trial court stated, "It was the
duty of the plaintiff before and at the time of occurrence to use ordinary care for the safety of his property. ' 7 The jury found in favor
of the defendant.
Whether or not the trial court properly admitted the plaintiff's assertion that the cattle had a preferential right to the highway, and
then correctly instructed the jury on his duty of care became the primary issues on appeal." Thus, for the first time, the New Mexico
Supreme Court was asked to determine the respective rights and
duties of livestock owners in open range lands.
The appellee, the defendant motorist, contended that the trial
court's instruction on duty was correct because there was a more basic
common law rule that made the running-at-large rule for animals on
highways inapplicable in the present day:
However, we do not believe that we are here concerned with a
change in the law. The Common Law has always placed upon us the
duty to conduct ourselves as ordinary prudent individuals, and this

is the duty of exercising ordinary care for the protection of ourselves
and others. .

.

.This duty of ordinary care, under conditions pre-

dating our modern system of highways and the heavy use thereof by
rapidly driven motor vehicles, did not embrace keeping livestock from
roads used by wagons, carts, bicycles and other such means of conveyance ...
,

..

,

,

[T]he duty or degree of care imposed upon us has not changed, but
changed highway conditions are so great that the conduct which at
one time constituted ordinary care can no longer be so held as a matter
of law, and to do so is to ignore or to repudiate the law itself. 9

In approving the trial court's instruction on the duty of care, the
supreme court agreed with this analysis of common law duties. But
6. Id. at 15-17.

7. Id. at 11.
S. The plaintiff's attorney contended vigorously that the trial court's instruction on
unavoidable accident was so erroneous that the case should be reversed on this point
alone. (Letter From John W. Reynolds, Esq., Feb. 8, 1966.) However, the issue of unavoidable accident was given rather summary treatment by the supreme court.
9. Brief for Appellee, pp. 24-25.
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the court did not confine itself to holding that the owner of livestock
in open range should give his animals "the attention and heed which
a reasonable and prudent person would accord them" 1 ° in order to
recover for their destruction. The court, by way of dictum, added:
[T]he owner of livestock .. .may be liable for injuries to motorists

resulting from collisions with his animals due to his negligence in permitting them to be on the highway."
Since the defendant, Wolfe, had not counterclaimed for the damages to his automobile, this dictum became merely a warning to the
owners of livestock that they might be held liable in the future. No
attempt was made to suggest what should be done to avoid liability.
Some critics may call the decision in Grubb judicial lawmaking.
But was it judicial lawmaking, or the judicial application of existing
common law? The decision in Grubb was probably judicial application of an already existing common law duty. In earlier cases requiring an interpretation of the duties of livestock owners, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that not even the common law duty to
keep livestock from trespassing on the lands of others applied in this
state.' 2 Thus if sheep, for example, wandered on the land of a neighbor, the neighbor could not recover for damages unless he showed
that the animals were turned loose with the intent that they should
wander on his land. 1 3 In the absence of "wilful trespass," as such
intent was termed, the neighbor could recover only if the sheep had
broken through his lawful fence.' 4 These cases dealt with the duties
of livestock owners to adjoining landowners; they did not attempt to
define the duties of livestock owners toward persons using the roads
in the state.
As indicated previously, 5 without statute or judicial precedent to
follow, it was apparently assumed in the trial courts before Grubb
that there was no duty to keep livestock off roads running through
10. 408 P.2d at 759.
11. Ibid. Although the court started its discussion by suggesting that the issue was
plaintiff's contributory negligence, this passage makes it apparent that the court really
meant negligence, not contributory negligence.
12. Hill v. Winkler, 21 N.M. 5, 151 Pac. 1014 (1915), Carnes v. Withers, 38 N.M.
441, 34 P.2d 1092 (1934). It should be noted that at common law the owner of livestock
had an absolute duty to keep his livestock off the property of others, but he had no duty
to keep them off the highways. See generally Comment, 10 Mont. L. Rev. 109 (1949).
13. Carnes v. Withers, supra note 12.
14. Ibid.
15. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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open range. Therefore, if a motorist struck a domestic animal, he was
liable to the owner for damages. This is not to say, however, that
the New Mexico Supreme Court was indulging in judicial lawmaking when it ruled against the livestock owner in Grubb v. Wolfe. It
has long been recognized that the common law would be applied in
this country only if it suited the circumstances and needs of our society.16 The New Mexico court stated its adherence to the adoption
of the common law as follows:
[E]xcept as superseded or abrogated by statute or constitution, or
held to be inapplicable to conditions in New Mexico, the common

law remains the rule of practice and decision ....17

With the defendant's reminder of the existence of a higher common law duty or care for one's property 8 on the one hand, and the
freedom to fashion the common law to meet our modern conditions
on the other, 9 the New Mexico Supreme Court could reach its decision in Grubb v. Wolfe free of any valid accusation of "judicial
20
lawmaking."

'

This appears to be the reasoning used by the supreme court in
Grubb. The California case of Galeppi Bros. v. Bartlett,2 ' as quoted
in a second California case, Jackson v. Hardy,22 formed the core of
16. 15 C.J.S. Common Law § 13, at 169 (Supp. 1966).
17. Ickes v.Brimhall,42 N.M.412,415, 79P.2d 942,943 (1938). (Emphasis added.)
18. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
19. However, legislative intent to protect the livestock owner could have been
gleaned from the 1965 addition (Laws 1965, ch. 221, § 1) to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-18-62
(Repl. 1965) :
C. No owner of livestock is liable for damages resulting from the presence
of his livestock upon any unfenced highway, in the absence of negligence of any
such owner.
Apparently this addition was not called to the attention of the supreme court. Although the Grubb collision occurred in 1963, knowledge of the 1965 statutory expansion
would have made it difficult for the court to rely on its own judgment of the modern
needs in New Mexico.
20. However, compare the court's remarks in Bouldin v. Sategna, 71 N.M. 329, 334,
378 P.2d 370, 373-74 (1963) (per Moise, J., who also wrote the opinion in Grubb) :
Plaintiff argues that with the transition from the horse and buggy age to that
of the highspeed car and jet airplanes, and from the period of steam and gas
powered energy to that of atom propulsion, we should keep pace with the times
and apply new and modern principles, better suited for our changed and changing world. We would answer the argument by pointing out that we are not
convinced that the rule we are urged to adopt would better serve the legal
needs of this new day, and even if we were we would be most hesitant to promulgate such rules to replace doctrine long established. This would seem to be
more properly for the legislature. [Emphasis added.]
21. 120 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1941).
22. 70 Cal. App. 2d 6, 160 P.2d 161 (1945).
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the opinion in Grubb. The facts in Galeppi Bros. were almost identical with the facts in Grubb, except that in Galeppi Bros. it was the
motorist suing for damages sustained when he collided with a cow
on a highway running through open range federal lands. The motorist
knew that livestock grazed along this road. The federal court of
appeals held that in the absence of a contrary opinion from the California appellate courts, it believed the owner of livestock had a
duty or ordinary care for his animals notwithstanding the common
law livestock-on-highways rule because changed conditions compelled
a different rule. 2 The motorist in Galeppi Bros. recovered his damages.
The decision in Grubb v. Wolfe did not go unnoticed. An editorial
writer for an Albuquerque newspaper called the decision "most appropriate in this modern high-speed age" and concluded that the
Grubb decision "appears to bring New Mexico out of the horse-andbuggy era. ' 24 The cattlemen of the state were not so enthusiastic.
They feared the potential liability threatened in Grubb.25
The New Mexico Cattle Growers' Association was instrumental
in proposing a remedial bill in the 1966 legislature.2 6 Senate Bill No.
25, as finally passed, has two main provisions: (1) the requirement
that in future highway construction or improvements by the State
Highway Department fences were to be included, 27 and (2) the
declaration that an owner of livestock on open range would not be
liable for damages resulting to motorists unless the owner were guilty
of "specific negligence." ' 28 In addition, the boards of county commis23. 120 F.2d at 210.
24-. Albuquerque Journal, Dec. 21, 1965, p. A-4, col. 1.
25. Interview With Lee S. Garner, Director, Cattle Sanitary Board of New Mexico,
March 11, 1966.
26. Letter From Robert W. Talbott, Executive Secretary, New Mexico Cattle Grower's Association, Feb. 8, 1966.
27. N.M. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 1, amends N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-8-10 (1953) to read
in part:
The state highway department shall:
(1) construct, inspect regularly, and maintain fences along all highways

under its jurisdiction which are constructed or improved from time to time after
the effective date of this act. . ..

28. N.M. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 2, amends N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-18-62 (Supp. 1965)
to include:
C. Owners of livestock ranging in pastures through which unfenced roads
or highways pass shall not be liable for damages by reason or injury or dam-

age to persons or property occasioned by collisions of vehicles using said roads
and highways and livestock or animals ranging in said pastures unless such
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sioners were directed to fence or post warning signs along highways within their jurisdiction "when the domestic livestock are
deemed a hazard to public health and safety as may be determined
by the county commissioners."29
This statutory declaration of no liability on the part of the owner
of livestock on open range unless he is guilty of specific negligence is
unique in the present day.8 0 It is a repudiation by the legislature of the
principles stated in Grubb v. Wolfe, and an affirmation of the common law rule insofar as the common law did not require the livestock
owner to keep his animals off the highways.
The necessity for the interpretation and application of "specific
negligence" will give the New Mexico Supreme Court broad authority to determine the effectiveness of Senate Bill No. 25 in relieving
the livestock owners of the liability forecast in Grubb. Proof of specific negligence requires that there be shown "some negligent acts ' or
'
omissions which were the proximate cause of the occurrence. 31
That the motorist must name some action or lack Of action on the
part of the livestock owner, other than the mere presence of the livestock on the road, would seem to be all the legislature is saying by
its use of the term "specific negligence." If this is the conclusion of the
supreme court, then it will be for the jury to decide the issues, as in
any other alleged negligence suit. Exactly what constitutes "specific
negligence" remains to be seen.
Driving the livestock on the road clearly would be specific negligence. More on the borderline, to be tested on a case-by-case basis,
owner of livestock is guilty of specific negligence other than allowing his animals
to range in said pasture.
See note 19 supra.
29. N.M. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 1 set forth in note 40 infra. (Emphasis added.)
30. Idaho is the only state that has any statute even closely approximating the New
Mexico statute. The Idaho statute (5 Idaho Code. Ann. § 25-2118 (Supp. 1963)) goes
even farther than the New Mexico statute. The Idaho statute states absolutely that
there is no duty to keep animals off highways in open range and there is no liability for
damages caused by a collision between vehicles and animals. Only two cases have considered this statute, neither case being useful in a discussion of Grubb. See Soran v.
Schoessler, 87 Idaho 426, 394 P.2d 160 (1964) ; Corthell v. Pearson, 88 Idaho 295, 399
P.2d 266 (1965). Texas seems to reach the same result through continued application
of the common law rule, Gholson v. Parrish, 92 S.W.2d 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), and
so does Louisiana, McGee v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 787 (La.
1960). It is curious that the requirement of "specific negligence" should be inserted
when that phrase seems primarily applicable in prohibiting reliance on res ipsa loquitur
as part of a plaintiff's suit for damages. See Price v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 220 Mo.
435, 119 S.W. 932 (1909). See generally Annot. 79 A.L.R. 48 (1932).
31. E.g., Harke v. Haase, 334 Mo. 1104,75 S.W. 1001, 1004 (1934).
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would be suits in which the livestock owner had placed watering holes,
feed, or salt blocks near the highway so as to draw the livestock to
that area. 2 Even more problematical situations would arise when
the livestock owner had not placed watering holes near the highway,
but had allowed the watering holes to remain after the highway was
constructed. Also to be decided is the effect knowledge or notice will
have in determining the existence of specific negligence. For example,
if the cattleman knows that his cattle tend to congregate on a particular bend in the highway, is he negligent if he fails to take any action
to keep them off the road? The answer would seem to be in the affirmative. In one New Mexico case, the supreme court held that notice of
a dangerous condition created a duty to take action where there otherwise was no duty.3 3 Thus, the livestock owner, ordinarily having no
duty to keep his animals off the highway, might have a duty to remove
them if he knew they were on the highway.
Reading Grubb in conjunction with Senate Bill No. 25 suggests
that each party in a livestock-vehicle collision on open range will bear
the costs of his own damages. But it is suspected that the concept of
proximate cause will gain increased importance in this area-the
motorist will attempt to show that certain acts of the livestock owner
never before thought to be negligent are indeed negligent, and that
these acts made the accident possible.
Violation of a statute is negligence per se in New Mexico, 3 4 but
two elements are required to make a party violating the statute liable
for an accident that follows: (1) the violation of the statute must
be the proximate cause of the accident, and (2) the statute must have
been enacted for the benefit of the party alleging injury. 5 For example, a motorist would not be automatically liable to the livestock
32. One source suggests that water, food, or salt within one mile of the highway
would satisfy the statutory requirement of specific negligence. This source suggests
further that the motorist striking an animal would be wise to inspect the surrounding
range lands immediately after the accident. (Interview With Robert W. Talbott, note
3 suPra.)

33. Huntsman v. Smith, 62 N.M. 457, 312 P.2d 103 (1957). The defendant had been
warned that a wall on his property line was in a deteriorating state. He did nothing.
Later, when the wall collapsed, damaging buildings owned by the plaintiff, the defendant was held liable. The court said that a reasonably prudent man would have
done something about it. See Green v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 58 Wash. 2d 307,
362 P.2d 593 (1961).

34. Hayes v. Hagemeier, 400 P.2d 945 (N.M. 1965).
35. Hayes v. Hagemeier, supra note 34. Zamora v. J. Korber & Co., 59 N.M. 33,
278 P.2d 569 (1954).
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owner if he were exceeding the speed limit. 6 Furthermore, the livestock owner would have to show that the statute violated had been
enacted for his benefit, a difficult task under current New Mexico case
law.37 It is to be expected that each party in a vehicle-livestock collision suit will more vigorously litigate the issues because each party
will be encouraged by either the judicial or the legislative developments in recent months. Each case arising will predictably involve a
charge of negligence, a defense of unavoidable accident, or a defense
of contributory negligence and, alternatively, a counterclaim based
on an allegation of no negligence on the part of the defendant but
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Because of the added possibilities, the duty of the jury in determining the merits of the conflicting
claims will become even more complex.
The 1966 legislature in enacting Senate Bill No. 2538 recognized
the solution to livestock-vehicle collisions: do away with the open
range by fencing. In requiring the State Highway Department to
fence highways constructed or repaired in the future, the legislature
began what will be a monumental task in New Mexico. 3 9 But the legislature did not go far enough. The counties were given the discretion
of whether or not to fence. 40 There are 48,000 miles of county roads
in New Mexico, but only 17,000 miles of roads of all other types. 4 1
No one knows how many miles of these roads are already fenced. Estimates of the cost of fencing on both sides of the highway vary be36. See Moss v. Acuff, 57 N.M. 572, 260 P.2d 1108 (1953) ; Shelton v. Rudd, 242
S.W. 151, 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922) (action for the death of a horse) :
In the case at bar it will not do to say merely the defendant was shown to have
been driving his car in a negligent manner that he is therefore guilty of damaging plaintiff. His negligently driving the car at the time might have been overwhelmingly shown; yet, if the injury accrued from other causes than such negligence, no liability grows from it.
37. See Hayes v. Hagemeier, 400 P.2d 945 (N.M. 1965), where the statute requiring
a school bus to flash lights when stopped to discharge passengers was held not for the
benefit of the school child.
38. See notes 27 & 28 supra and note 40 infra.
39. This was a policy already adopted by the State Highway Department so that
the legislature was not really enacting anything new. (Letter from Joseph L. Droege,
Special Assistant Attorney General, State of New Mexico, Feb. 8, 1966.)
40. N.M. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 1:
C. Each board of county commissioners shall similarly fence or post signs
along highways within its jurisdiction when the domestic livestock are deemed
a hazard to public health and safety as may be determined by the county commissioners.
41. Letter From Joseph L. Droege, note 39 supra.
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tween $1000 per mile4" and $4000 per mile.4" At these rates many
counties will never fence so long as they are not required to do so.
Therefore, under the present legislation, the open range will continue to exist with the consequent collisions between animals and
vehicles.
The basic question finally becomes whether it is cheaper to fence
or cheaper to have collisions. In 1965 there were 501 reported collisions between animals and motor vehicles in rural areas of New
Mexico.44 A few of these accidents involved deer; most involved
livestock. Unfortunately, there is no record of how many of the accidents occurred on open range roads. In the reported accidents 2
people were killed and 95 were injured.4 5 One source estimates that
at least 1200 collisions with livestock occurred in open range during
1965.46 (Many collisions are not reported because of the motorists'
justified fear of liability.)
Perhaps at this time it is cheaper to endure the collisions, but
thought should be given to the future. In twenty years traffic on county
roads, as well as on state roads, will be much heavier. Fencing on all
roads of the state will probably become a necessity, though presently
it may appear impossible that what is now semi-arid grazing land
will become green agricultural land tended by a growing population.
Thought should also be given to the means potentially available
for financing fences. If the counties are unable to afford the gradual
fencing of their roads, state aid might be provided; 4 7 or the owners
of property abutting the highways might share the cost of fence construction with the counties. There is no easy solution, but efforts
should be made now to find a means of eliminating the hazardous conditions created by livestock on the roadways.
Until fences can be constructed, the state and the counties could
make the highways less attractive to livestock (and to the motorists,
also, unhappily) by either scraping the grass from the sides of the
highway, or by periodically burning the grass along the road right-ofways.
A problem touched on only briefly in Grubb concerns what can be
42. Interview With Robert W. Talbott, note 3 supra.
43. Letter From Joseph L. Droege, note 39, supra.
44. Letter From John R. Bradford, Jr., Chief, New Mexico State Police, March 2,
1966.
45. Ibid.
46. Interview With Lee S. Garner, note 25 supra.
47. Sections 55-2-23 and 55-2-24, N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl. 1962), seem to authorize
state aid to counties for road construction.
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done if, as in Grubb, the livestock owner cannot fence (presumably
the state or county cannot fence) the grazing lands belonging to the
federal government.4" In this respect legislation is needed on the
national level to require the fencing of federal lands. This cost might
be reflected in the price of grazing permits issued to livestock owners.
In conclusion, the New Mexico Supreme Court has spoken on the
duty of livestock owners in open range, and the legislature has replied indicating lesser duty. The effectiveness of the legislature's
pronouncements on duty rests with the courts because they will define
and apply the statutory phrase "specific negligence." But the legislature's proposal for the ultimate solution of open range collisionsfencing-remains with the legislature. Legislation requiring the
counties to fence their roads and extending financial aid to help them
do it should now be enacted.
CLEOPATRA CAMPBELL

48. Brief for Appellant, note 5 supra, p. 15. See generally Comment, 22 Mont. L. Rev.
87 (1960).

